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In a societal context where the distinction between private and public exercise of power becomes blurred, and 
where a multitude of private interactions increasingly affect the equal enjoyment of fundamental rights of a wide 
range of subjects, ‘horizontality’ is warranted re-conceptualisation in its purpose and parameters. Denoting the 
application of rights disputes between private parties, the doctrine of horizontality questions the traditional 
application of fundamental rights against the state. An investigation of its function and criteria is particularly 
compelling, and at once extremely challenging, in the context of the EU: a hybrid supranational constitutional 
order and a public sphere historically privileging market actors.1 Horizontality is becoming a pressing doctrine, 
particularly as cases brought to the CJEU concern less and less market-focused issues, and more frequently touch 
upon socially-relevant issues.2 In the light of the Court’s narrow-sighted interpretation of horizontality, how can 
the latter be re-conceptualised and justified? Which criteria should guide its determination and why? These 
questions are at the heart of Dr. Eleni Frantziou’s insightful and forward-thinking book on The Horizontal Effect 
of Fundamental Rights in the European Union.  
The book represents an urgent contribution to the body of literature addressing the horizontal effect of 
fundamental rights in EU law. Especially following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, scholars have cast 
their attention on the horizontal effect of the EU Charter and fundamental rights more in general: the focus has 
been on the status and extent of application of the Charter in horizontal situations (Lenaerts 2010; Leczykiewicz 
2013); the scope of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights as general principles (Spaventa 2011; Tridimas 
2013); broader issues of constitutionalisation of EU private law (Ferreira 2010; Cherednychenko and Reich 
2016); and finally accounts and criticisms of the development of the horizontality doctrine in the caselaw of the 
ECJ in the context of fundamental rights (Walkila 2016). As questions have revolved around how and whether 
fundamental rights should, if at all, enjoy horizontal effect; Frantziou’s book manages to distinctively add to this 
literature by asking ‘why’ questions that go at the root of the debates, by providing the basis whence discussions 
can be prompted as to the how, whether and should. 
The main argument of the book flows from her finding that the way horizontality has developed in the 
ECJ caselaw has neglected considerations of a constitutional type; and has instead focused on the drier aim of 
maintaining the primacy of EU law.3 Frantziou highlights blatant discrepancies and inchorences in the Court’s 
reasoning: from the legacy of Van Gend and Loos and Defrenne,4 the mechanisms that the Court created to, first, 
limit the application of horizontal direct effect (Marshall and Faccini Dori)5 and then to counteract instances of 
lack of horizontal effect (Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur),6 led to a formalistic and source-based approach 
that Frantziou qualifies as “far from self-evident”7 and surely not satisfactory from a constitutional perspective; 
the rulings in Mangold and Kücükdeveci on the horizontal effect of fundamental rights as general principles of 
EU law8 also were not applied consistently to all the rights of the Charter.9 Post-Lisbon, the direction of the 
Court’s reasoning did not change significantly and additionally avoided discussing the direct effect of the 
Charter when it should have (AMS).10 The general thread is rather one of functional and inconsistent lines of 
argument, which smartly avoid more political and content-related judgments. Recent caselaw that more 
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thoroughly analyses the horizontal applicability of provisions conferring individual rights is presented as adding 
further uncertainty (DI and Egenberger).11 
What the authors refers to as a one-dimensional, ad hoc and casuistic approach of the Court is judged 
inadequate against recent social and legal developments.12 The author convincingly argues that the need emerges 
to rethink the “normative underpinnings of horizontality” in the context of fundamental rights.13 The Charter is 
presented as a revived benchmark for what the EU should set out to be, hence providing new ground for how 
horizontality should be understood. Against a backdrop of EU law gradually shifting from a state- to an 
individual-based interpretation of the Treaties,14 Frantziou’s main argument seems to suggest that a step further 
is necessary: in order to achieve the inclusionary potential of the doctrine of horizontality, such step would rest 
on an interpretation that looked at the individual as a participant of a political community; not as an isolated 
bearer of rights, but someone to be recognised as an equal holder of rights in the collective dimension,15 and 
who should thus be able to enjoy them equally in the public sphere. Horizontality is therefore understood as 
performing this function. 
The problem underlying the rethinking of horizontality can be said to be multifaceted in nature: it is 
theoretical, inasmuch it contemplates how horizontality can be understood through the lenses of constitutional 
theory, and how the latter can provide the tools to conceive of the function of horizontality in a different, more 
principled way; it is also legal, as it has to do with conflicts and balance of rights as constitutional claims, not 
least with why and on which criteria horizontality should be determined; finally, it also possesses social 
relevance, as the main argument is driven by concerns of inequality and unequal enjoyment of rights, which a 
novel assessment of horizontality should take into consideration. In addition, while the author excludes any 
stepping into the realm of normativity, it could be argued that by presenting the Charter as the justification for a 
renewed horizontal doctrine, normativity can be found in what the EU is said it should strive to be.16 The 
different dimensions of the problem are reflected in the structure of the book, which is divided into three main 
parts, dealing respectively with the theory, the caselaw and the test proposed.  
Part I discusses the doctrine of horizontality within constitutional theory, arguing that when conceived as 
‘fundamental to’ a political community, fundamental rights necessitate a constitutional interpretation that takes 
into account their function of enabling equal participation in public life. In doing so, Frantziou addresses the very 
fundamental question of why horizontality should apply, as opposed to the more traditional how question, 
relating to whether the claim fulfils legalistic requirements of direct effect and horizontal relationship. To justify 
the need for such theoretical foundations, Part II provides a sound and comprehensive overview of the 
development of the caselaw on the matter, while providing a critical perspective on it. The discussion on the 
caselaw pre- and post-Lisbon is separated for methodological reasons, yet it is found that only small 
improvements have characterised the caselaw following the adoption of the Charter when compared to the 
framework in Part I. Against these deficiencies, Part III puts forward the substantive elements for an assessment 
of horizontality based on the concept of political equality. 
The core contribution of the book lies in this original and forward-looking exercise that aims to design a 
test for horizontality, through a reconceptualisation of the doctrine that departs from the shape that it has so far 
inherited from the caselaw. From the standpoint that neither the fundamental nature of the right, nor the 
relevance of it to a private dispute would be sufficient to determine the applicability of horizontality, Frantziou 
relies on the concept of political equality. It follows that there emerges a willingness to find a justification for 
horizontality that, first, goes beyond the state/individual and the public/private divides by advocating a public 
law reasoning for private disputes; and, second, that also goes beyond the protection of fundamental rights as 
such, by understanding them as avenues of political equality. In this sense, it is forward-looking since it 
substantially criticises the current approach and engages into the development of a new one. Such exercise, while 
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seeking to develop a new methodology beyond current practice, is able to fit the boundaries of the existing legal 
framework, and is hence highly innovative and reasonable.  
Probably not doing justice to its depth, Frantziou’s reasoning can be summarised as follows: political 
equality is the concept that best resonates with the purpose and content of the Charter;17 in turn, fundamental 
rights are considered avenues for such political equality, as their fulfilment in private relations with public 
relevance contributes to democratic processes and in particular to the equal exercise of rights of “those 
individuals whose political status cannot be guaranteed by public institutions”.18 For political equality to happen, 
then, fundamental rights should guide the reasoning of horizontality, through lenses that looked at the 
constitutional relevance of horizontal fundamental rights as enabling conditions for interaction in the public 
sphere.19 The aim of accommodating a reconceptualisation of horizontality to the existing legal framework yet 
implies a dense creative exercise: bridges and logical links are built between concepts and revisited purposes, in 
a particular context of social interactions and power-relations. What at first sight would look like a 
reconceptualisation of horizontality brings with it also important reflections on the role of fundamental rights in 
the public sphere, not least about the direction of the EU as a political community.  
The methodological approach is perfectly adapted to the multifaceted nature of the problem. While not 
explicitly mentioned, a law-in-context approach unfolds from the way the social context where the law operates - 
that of the public sphere where the rights ought to be equally enjoyed - is taken into consideration in the 
conceptualisation of horizontality. The individual is not looked in isolation, but appreciated in its private 
interactions with other subjects when participating in the political community. Related to this, underlying the 
book is the acknowledgement of the changes in power interactions in society, as well as the obsolescence of the 
distinction between private and public in determining the kind of reasoning that will guide horizontality. These 
social interactions are thus imbued, and effectively addressed, in the new justification for horizontality. In this 
sense, Frantziou’s book centrally contributes to discussions of how the law and its function are (and should be) 
shaped by the societal context. This perspective is also entirely coherent with the criticism addressed to the 
Court, namely its doctrinal and too formalistic interpretations. Such an approach additionally gains more strength 
as the Court’s struggle in examining rights in their “operation within a social context” is expressly recognised by 
the author.20 
By way of conclusion, Frantziou’s book bears significance on a number of fronts. It is a very ambitious, 
meticulous and logic endeavour, able to address, from the specific issue of horizontality, directional questions 
and broader debates relating to the EU as a polity. In the legal field, it provides an innovative contribution to the 
evolution, reasoning and role of the horizontality doctrine; the test that is put forward could potentially serve as 
ground for future claims brought to the Court, and in this sense, steer the direction of its reasoning. If this was 
the case, social significance would also stem from a more thorough interpretation of the content and policising 
effect of fundamental rights, and their role in achieving a political community where rights were enjoyed 
equally. The book is extremely relevant for future research, too. Especially in the light of the most recent 
caselaw on the matter, such as Bauer and Cresco,21 further studies could assess the extent to which the Court’s 
reasoning has moved closer to Frantziou’s principled justification. Further research could also consider whether 
the problems relating to horizontality are exclusively peculiar to the EU as a hybrid constitutional supranational 
order; and/or to what extent it would be possible to apply the core of Frantziou’s thesis to other systems of 
governance beyond the state. The book will be of great value for scholars to appreciate the extensiveness of 
fundamental rights applicability in private relations today, from an EU law and constitutional theory perspective. 
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